To evade the well-known impossibility of unconditionally secure quantum two-party computations, previous quantum private comparison protocols have to adopt a third party. Here we study how far we can go with two parties only. We propose a very feasible and efficient protocol. Intriguingly, although the average amount of information leaked cannot be made arbitrarily small, we find that it never exceeds 14 bits for any length of the bit-string being compared.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private comparison, a.k.a. the socialist millionaire problem [1] , is a two-party cryptographic task in which two millionaires Alice and Bob want to determine if their wealth a and b are equal, without revealing their actual wealth. It is analogous to a more general problem whose goal is to compare two numbers a and b, without revealing any extra information on their values other than what can be inferred from the comparison result. As a typical example of secure multi-party computations, this problem plays an essential role in cryptography. It has many applications in e-commerce and data mining where people need to compare numbers which are confidential.
Nevertheless, it is well-known that unconditionally secure quantum two-party secure computations are impossible [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , i.e., the dishonest party can always obtain a non-trivial amount of information on the secret data of the other party. Quantum private comparison (QPC) is also covered. To circumvent the problem, almost all existing QPC protocols ( [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] and the references therein) added a third party to help Alice and Bob accomplish the comparison. The only exception is Ref. [26] , in which such a third party is absent. But it was later found to be insecure [25, 27] because the secret data of the honest party will always be exposed completely to the other party.
While quantum cryptography has displayed promising power in many fields such as quantum key distribution [28] , it is depressing if it cannot give a good solution to this simple problem. Also, involving a third party is undoubtfully less convenient for the practical applications of QPC. Thus it brings us to the question "what can we achieve for QPC when it is limited to two parties only?" Here we will propose such a protocol, in which only a very small amount of information on the secret data being compared will be leaked to the dishonest party. Therefore, despite that it is not unconditionally secure, it reaches a very useful security level and the elimination of the third party highly enhances the convenience of QPC. As there was very little progress made during * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn the last decade in the realm ruled out by the existing impossibility proofs [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , we can expect our protocol to play more important roles in the practical applications of multi-party secure computations.
II. OUR PROTOCOL
Let H(x) be a classical hash function which is a 1-to-1 mapping between the n-bit strings x and y = H(x) (i.e., H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n ). Denote the two orthogonal states of a qubit as |0 0 and |1 0 , respectively, and define
That is, the subscript σ = 0, 1 in |γ σ stands for two incommutable measurement bases, while γ = 0, 1 distinguishes the two states in the same basis. We propose the following protocol.
The QPC Protocol (for comparing Alice's n-bit string a ≡ a 1 a 2 ...a n and Bob's n-bit
(1) Using the hash function H(x), Alice calculates the n-bit string h A ≡ h 
III. CORRECTNESS
In step (2) of the protocol, when |γ i hi is measured in the basis h i , the results will always be γ i . But if it is measured in a different basish i , both the results γ i andγ i can occur with the equal probabilities 1/2. Therefore, when Alice and Bob input the same secret data a = b, there will be h n , the case that they have j (j ∈ [1, n]) different bits will occur with probability
Consequently, in each of the corresponding j rounds of step (2), the qubit will be prepared in the state |γ i hi while being measured in the basish i , and has probability 1/2 to give the resultγ i , causing the protocol to abort and output the correct comparison result a = b. The only exception is that all these j qubits still give the result γ i though measured in the basish i . In this case the protocol will incorrectly output the result a = b while they are actually inequal. This will occur with probability (1/2) j . Summing over all possible j values, the total probability for getting an incorrect comparison result is
Therefore, our protocol is not an ideal one. Fortunately, in practical applications n is generally very high, so that p inc will be very close to 0. For example, when comparing two 32-bit strings (i.e., n = 32), the above equation shows that the incorrect comparison result occurs with probability p inc ≃ 0.01% only. Also, if the protocol finally outputs a = b in step (3) but Alice and Bob want to further verify this result, they can replace a and b with a ⊕ s and b ⊕ s, respectively, and run the entire protocol all over again from step (1). Here s is a random n-bit string chosen by either party and announced to the other party. Then whether a indeed equals b will be judged more precisely so that the probability p inc for finally getting a wrong comparison result will be further reduced. But it is obvious that the price is that more information on the secret data a and b will be leaked as they are reused in the protocol for many times. For simplicity, in the following we merely study the amount of information leaked when the protocol is run only once.
IV. SECURITY
There is surely no security problem to consider when a = b, because both parties naturally know the secret data of each other from the comparison result. Now let us study how much information is leaked when the protocol outputs a = b.
An important feature of our protocol is that, if it aborts after running m (1 ≤ m ≤ n) rounds of step (2), the last n − m bits of h A and h B will not be compared any more. They will not be encoded with qubits and transferred in the protocol at all. Thus it is obvious that these bits remain completely secret to the other party. As a consequence, the amount of mutual information leaked to each party is m bits at the most.
To increase m, a dishonest party surely wants to make the protocol abort as late as possible. Therefore, if Alice (Bob) cheats, in each of the odd (even) rounds of step (2.3) she (he) will always announce γ , so that the protocol will never abort in these rounds. In each of the rest k ≡ m/2 even rounds (for dishonest Alice) or k ≡ (m+ 1)/2 odd rounds (for dishonest Bob) among the first m rounds of step (2), the cheater has to announce γ i in step (2.2) before the other party does so in step (2.3). Since he wishes to announce a value that satisfies γ A i = γ B i so that the protocol will not abort, he needs to guess the γ i value of the qubit state |γ i hi that the other party sent him in step (2.1). That is, he needs to distinguish between the density matrices ρ γi=0 ≡ (|0 hi=0 0| + |0 hi=1 0|)/2 and ρ γi=1 ≡ (|1 hi=0 1| + |1 hi=1 1|)/2. Calculations show that the maximal probability for distinguishing these two density matrices is
Therefore, the dishonest party can force each of these k rounds to continue with probability p max at the most. Consequently, the probability for the protocol to abort at the mth round (i.e., it happens to continue for the first k − 1 even (odd) rounds while aborts at the k-th even (odd) round when Alice (Bob) cheats) is
That is, with probability p m abort the protocol will abort at the mth round, and the dishonest party will know nothing about the rest n − m bits of the other's hash value, so that he learns m bits of information at the most. Summing over all possible m values and recall that m = 2k (m = 2k − 1) for dishonest Alice (Bob), the upper bound of the average amount of mutual information leaked is for dishonest Alice, or (6) for dishonest Bob. Here [x] means the integer part of x. The above I A and I B are different because our protocol is asymmetric. In the i = 1 round of step (2) Alice prepares the qubit, and she does not announces γ A i until Bob announces γ B i . Thus dishonest Alice can always ensure that the protocol will continue at least to the second round. But dishonest Bob cannot completely avoid the protocol abort in the first round, making him obtain less information than dishonest Alice.
In Fig. 1 we show I A and I B as a function of the length n of the bit-strings a and b being compared. Intriguingly, the result reveals that the average amount of mutual information leaked never excesses 14 bits (for dishonest Alice) or 13 bits (for dishonest Bob) for any length n of a and b. This is because when a = b, the protocol stands a very high probability to abort after merely a few rounds of step (2) . Thus the rest bits of h A and h B will remain secret to the other party as their information are never announced in the protocol.
Also, I A and I B are merely loose upper bounds, because in the above calculations we assumed that when the protocol aborts at the mth round of step (2), the cheater obtains m bits of information. But actually this will not occur with probability 1. For example, the optimal operation that can distinguish the density matrices ρ γi=0 and ρ γi=1 with probability p max = cos 2 (π/8) is in fact the measurement that projects the state |γ i hi in the basis {cos(π/8) |0 0 + sin(π/8) |1 0 , cos(5π/8) |0 0 + sin(5π/8) |1 0 }. But this operation provides absolutely zero knowledge on the value of h i . Other operations (such as the honest operation in the protocol) can learn h i with a higher probability, but result in a lower probability for distinguishing ρ γi=0 and ρ γi=1 . While the number of cheating strategies could be numerous, there is no doubt that its probability for learning h i in each round can never exceed 1, and it can distinguish ρ γi=0 and ρ γi=1 (and thus avoid the protocol from aborting) with a probability no greater than p max . Therefore, as our above analysis assumes that the dishonest party can distinguish ρ γi=0 and ρ γi=1 with the probability p max exactly while always know h i with certainty, the bounds I A and I B are sufficiently general to cover any kind of cheating strategies.
Moreover, note that the information leaked is not the direct information on the strings a and b being compared, but the information on their hash values instead. Thus it is less useful for the cheater in practice. 
V. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING QPC PROTOCOLS
As pinpointed out in Section 4 of Ref. [21] and also in Ref. [22] , many previous QPC protocols with a third party also have a non-trivial amount of information leaked to at least one of the parties. Most of them are also less feasible as they require the use of entanglement, joint measurements, and quantum memory. On the contrary, our protocol can easily be implemented without these resources. For example, we can use 0
• , 90
• , 45
• , 135
• polarized photons as the carrier of the qubit states |0 0 , |1 0 , |0 1 , |1 1 in the protocol, respectively. The receiver can measure them immediately, without the need to store them. Also, in step (2) Alice and Bob send a single qubit in each round. Once the protocol aborts, they no longer need to send qubits to compare the rest bits of h A and h B . The fact that the average amount of information leaked is below 14 bits indicates that the protocol averagely takes only 14 rounds to abort. That is, when a = b, in average our protocol merely takes 14 qubits to complete the comparison, thus it is extremely efficient. More importantly, all these are accomplished without the need for the third party.
